This paper provides new evidence of consumers' reaction to an anticipated sizable change in income. Until FY2002, Japanese public employees received predictable large bonus payments three times a fiscal year (in June, December, and March), but the March bonus was abolished in FY2003. We compare the seasonal patterns of public employees' expenditure before and after the reform of the bonus payment schedule.
Introduction
One of the central tenets of the standard life-cycle/permanent income hypothesis (LC/PIH) is that individuals engage in consumption smoothing 1 and that income changes that are anticipated should not affect the pattern of consumption. According to the hypothesis, individuals optimizing their consumption path dynamically over their lifetime respond to a (predicted) change in income at the time they become aware of the change, not when it actually materializes. Therefore, in theory, there should be no association between individuals' pattern of consumption and an anticipated change in the pattern of income unless some underlying assumptions of the LC/PIH, such as the absence of liquidity constraints, are violated.
However, notwithstanding the straightforward theoretical prediction, empirical studies on the LC/PIH have produced mixed results. A number of empirical studies using aggregate data, such as Campbell and Mankiw (1989) , have reported that consumers in fact do respond to predicted income changes at the time they occur (rather than when they first becomes aware of them). Recent empirical studies using micro data to examine the impact of policy-induced income changes have obtained similar findings (Souleles, 1999 (Souleles, , 2002 Parker, 1999; Shapiro and Slemrod, 1995, 2003; and Shimizutani, 2006) . On the other hand, there are also a number of micro data-based studies focusing on the effect of large and regular (easily predictable) income movements that report that the LC/PIH describes consumption behavior well (Paxson, 1993; Browning and Collado, 2001; and Hsieh, 2003) .
These conflicting findings may be explained by the fact that earlier studies focused on income shock episodes of different sizes and types to identify the effect of predicted income changes on consumption. While studies that examined relatively small anticipated income movements caused by policy changes often found excess sensitivity in consumption, other studies that examined the effect of large and regular income movements appear to find consumption smoothing. 2 Some scholars employ the bounded rationality argument that consumers behave in the manner predicted by the LC/PIH when the cost of calculating the anticipated income change is low and the utility gain from smoothing consumption is large.
While the bounded rationality argument appeals to economists as it allows for rational economic agents, whether it really holds is open to discussion. Another possible explanation for the mixed results is that some of the cases examined in previous studies
were not appropriate episodes for testing the consumption response to anticipated income changes. More concretely, most of the income change data examined in previous studies were constructed using observed household characteristics that are not necessarily randomly distributed (see Johnson, Parker and Souleles, 2006; Coulibaly and Li, 2006; and Stephens, 2008 for a discussion of this point). In other words, a certain share of previous studies on this topic probably fail to validate the assumption that household characteristics used to construct household income changes are uncorrelated with all other unobserved determinants of consumption growth, rendering their empirical findings less reliable.
Against this background, the purpose of this paper is to exploit an ideal episode of exogenous income change and reliable micro data from Japan's Family Income and Expenditure Survey (FIES) to re-examine the issue of consumption smoothing in 2 A few more recent studies (Stephens and Unayama, 2011; Hori and Shimizutani, 2009 ) on Japanese households, for which very detailed and reliable diary-based monthly FIES data are available, report that the monthly patterns of expenditure appear to be significantly affected by anticipated large changes in the pattern of individuals' income.
response to a predictable income change. Specifically, the episode we focus on is the following. Until FY2002, public employees in Japan conventionally received large and predictable bonus payments three times a year, in June, December, and March; however, the March bonus was abolished from FY2003 (i.e., from March 2004), with sufficient advance notice given in FY2002. As this represents a large and predictable income change, we utilize this episode to test the LC/PIH by comparing the seasonal pattern of public employees' expenditure before and after the change in the pattern of bonus payments. Although the FIES only provides data on household expenditure (rather than consumption), we attempt to examine household consumption patterns by focusing on a number of expenditure subcategories of different durability, that is, non-durables, services, semi-durables, and durables.
The combination of an ideal episode and the rich information provided by the micro-level data from the FIES presents us with a perfect setting for the examination of households' reaction to an anticipated income change. The reasons are as follows. First, salary and bonus payments to public employees in Japan are exogenously predetermined. While bonus payments in the private sector are also large, predictable, and highly institutionalized, it is likely that at least part of these bonuses are performance-based, leaving room for discriminating payments, and whether a worker receives a bonus or not may not be random. On the other hand, as described in the following section, bonus payments to public employees are regulated by law, leaving no room for performance-based adjustments, and are therefore anticipated without uncertainty. By comparing the seasonal pattern of public employees' expenditure before and after the bonus payment reform, we can avoid potential endogeneity from non-random observations. Second, the episode of the bonus payment reform in the Japanese public sector allows us to examine consumers' response to a sizable change in the timing of income payments, since the amount of lifetime earnings remained largely unchanged. That is, although the March bonus, which was equivalent to roughly half a month's salary, was abolished from FY2003, the total amount of annual bonus payments remained broadly unchanged, since the bonus amount was simply added to the other two bonus payments, thus resulting in larger bonuses in June and December. As in the episode examined by Shapiro and Slemrod (1995) , this episode allows us to distill the effect of an anticipated income change without considering other factors that could affect a household's permanent income.
Third, the monthly income and expenditure data from the FIES are considered to be highly reliable. Data reliability is of crucial importance for the Euler equation
analysis, which uses a first difference-based specification. While earlier studies that examined large and regular income changes used retrospective quarterly data, the FIES data used in this paper are monthly data based on family account books (diaries) that sample households are requested to fill in and that are collected twice a month.
Therefore, there are likely to be far fewer measurement errors in the FIES expenditure data than in the datasets used in earlier studies, such as the U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey, which asks households to recall their spending over the previous three months.
Although studies on large and regular income changes using quarterly data so far have not yet rejected the LC/PIH, they may have overlooked a deviation from it owing to the less reliable quality of the retrospective data used. Therefore, our question is whether the expenditure patterns of public employees, which were recorded in the reliable monthly FIES data, were significantly affected by the exogenous change in the pattern of income due to the abolition of the March bonus in FY2003. To do so, we basically compare the expenditure pattern of public employees in the post-reform period (July 2003 -June 2008 with that in the pre-reform period (July 1997 -June 2002 . In the first instance, we do so without any control group in our regression analysis. Later, we then use private sector employees as a control group to confirm that our results do not reflect factors common to public and private sector employees.
In contrast with earlier studies on the effect of large and regular income movements (such as Browning and Collado, 2001, and Hsieh, 2003) , we find that Japanese public employee households did not entirely smooth their expenditure in the face of an anticipated large change in the pattern of income. The monthly pattern of public employees' expenditure significantly changed after the abolition of the March bonus, seemingly rejecting the LC/PIH. However, taking a closer look, it emerges that excess sensitivity of expenditure is clearly observed only for expenditure subcategories of some durability, i.e., durables and semi-durables. Therefore, our result does not rule out the possibility that Japanese households are still smoothing the flow of services from the consumption of durables, as the LC/PIH essentially predicts.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the bonus system for Japanese public employees and the abolition of the March bonus in FY2003. Section 3 explains the FIES dataset used in this study. Section 4 runs several regressions to compare the monthly expenditure patterns of public employees before and after the March bonus abolition. Section 5 then extends the regressions to include private sector employees as a control group to examine the robustness of our findings.
Finally, Section 6 summarizes our findings and concludes.
Bonus payments to public employees and the abolition of the March bonus
In Japan, the salaries and allowances of workers in the central government are uniformly regulated by law, with the National Personnel Authority (Jinji in, henceforth NPA) in charge of administration. 3 The salary schedules and allowances, including bonus payments for national government employees, are revised annually in August based on NPA recommendations (in the "Remuneration Report and Recommendation") for the next fiscal year, 4 mainly taking account of the salary gap between the private and the public sector. The proposal is then debated in parliament and, in most cases, approved without modification in the fall of the year before it takes effect. The process is open to public scrutiny and widely reported in the media, making payment schedules in the next year fairly predictable.
It is important to stress here that monthly salary payments and bonuses for public employees are completely predetermined and, unlike in private firms, unaffected by personal performance. Moreover, unlike bonus payments in the private sector that fluctuate depending on current business conditions, the bonus amount and payment date are scheduled entirely in advance and anticipated without uncertainty. Salaries and allowances for local government employees follow the pay schedule for central government employees, although there are minor variations across prefectures and municipalities. 
Data description
The data used in this study are micro-level data from the To ensure that our findings in this paper do not depend on sample selection, we employed two different samples in the empirical analysis below, that is, a "broadly-defined sample" and a "narrowly-defined sample". To construct the former, we dropped observations for households with a self-employed (or a jobless) household head since we do not have monthly income information for these households. After dropping households for which monthly income information is not available, our analysis is restricted to wage earner households, which account for roughly half of all observations in the FIES. We further confine our sample to households where the head of household is an office, or white-collar, worker. Using this broadly-defined sample, we will examine whether the seasonal expenditure pattern of public employee households changed after the abolition of the March bonus. To confirm the validity of the findings, we will also examine whether the observed changes in the seasonal pattern differ between public sector employee households (the "public sector group") and private sector employee households (the "private sector group"), using households whose head works for a large private company with more than 1,000 employees as our control group.
Although we focus on white-collar households so as to examine households of 7 The FIES simply asks respondents to enter their expenditures by category in a diary. The form to be filled in by respondents and instructions for diary keeping can be found in Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (various years). When publishing the FIES, the Ministry groups the goods and services listed in the diary into four categories (based on their durability). Details of the classification of specific goods into the four categories are shown in Appendix 2.
roughly comparable attributes, occupational choice is not entirely random, and there remains some heterogeneity between the two groups (other than the timing of bonus receipts). Moreover, the two groups in the broadly-defined sample contain households that receive bonuses in months other than the regular bonus months, i.e., June (or July) and December in the case of private sector employees, and June, December, and -until FY2002 -March in the case of public sector employees, or that receive no bonuses at all. Therefore, to make the two groups homogeneous except for the timing of bonus receipts, we additionally construct the narrowly-defined sample. We do so by further confining our sample to male sole earner households and excluding households that reported no bonus receipts in the regular bonus months, i.e., June (or July 8 ), December, and March for public employee households until FY2002, and June (or July) and
December for public and private sector employee households from FY2003 (either because they received no bonuses or failed to enter them in the diary). Moreover, we exclude households that report bonus receipts in months other than the regular bonus months. The number of observations in the narrowly-defined sample is about 40 percent of that in the broadly-defined sample. Table 2 shows the ratio of bonus receipts to regular monthly salaries (both for all households, i.e., including those not receiving a bonus, and for those receiving a bonus) as well as the share of bonus recipients both for the broadly-defined sample (Panel (a) ) and the narrowly-defined sample (Panel (b) Looking at the narrowly-defined sample (Panel (b)), we find that the abolition of the March bonus for public sector employees means that the bonus/salary ratio fell from 0.45 to zero.
Turning to the bonuses in other regular bonus months, roughly 75-85 percent of public sector employee households report that they receive a bonus in summer and in winter, while the share among private sector employee households is less than 70 percent. However, looking at the bonus/salary ratio for private sector employee households that do receive a bonus, this is more or less comparable to that for public sector employee households. When we compare the pre-and post-reform periods, the bonus/salary ratios and the bonus recipient shares appear to have decreased in all regular bonus months, probably reflecting the slowdown of Japanese economy.
However, it goes without saying that the fall in bonus receipts (from the pre-reform to the post-reform period) is most remarkable for the March bonus for the public sector group. Finally, Panel (b) for the narrowly-defined sample confirms that the bonus/salary ratio and the bonus recipient share are broadly similar for the two groups except for the March bonus payments to the public sector group until FY2002.
The sample statistics of our dataset are reported in in the broadly-defined sample, but look very similar for the two groups in the narrowly-defined sample. In addition, in each sample, the two groups also look similar in terms of their demographic characteristics such as age of the household head, number of family members, and number of workers in the household. Therefore, the sample statistics suggest that households in the public and private sector groups are broadly similar (except for the bonus payment in March before its abolition), especially when the two groups are compared using the narrowly-defined sample.
Changes in patterns of monthly expenditure after the bonus reform
In this section, using monthly observations from the FIES, we examine whether there are any changes in the pattern of public employees' monthly income and expenditure from the pre-reform period with the March bonus to the post-reform period without it.
In order to statistically capture changes after the abolition of the March bonus, we run is assumed to be a well-behaved error term. We employ OLS to obtain the coefficient estimates.
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The results of the estimation are shown in ) correspond to the pattern of monthly 9 Strictly speaking, the model was estimated with a constant and eleven monthly dummies, while we use twelve monthly dummies here to simplify our explanation. 10 In order to derive the seasonal income and expenditure patterns, we also calculated simple sample averages without imposing linear restrictions. The calculated patterns look quite similar to those obtained from the regression analysis below (see Appendix 3 for a comparison). Table 4 - (a) , which are calculated using the broadly-defined sample, suggest that the monthly disposable income of public sector employee households used to increase by 10 percent in March and decrease by 18 percent in April in the pre-reform period. In contrast, in the post-reform period, the pattern of monthly disposable income appears to have reversed, as the coefficients on the interaction terms more than offset the pre-reform coefficients. The smoothing in disposable income in spring comes out more clearly in the narrowly-defined sample (see and Table 4 - (b) ). While disposable income used to increase on the previous month by 28 percent in March and decrease by 38 percent in April in the pre-reform period, this swing more or less disappeared in the post-reform period, with disposable income actually decreasing by 13 percent in March and increasing by 3 percent in April. In other word, the abolition of the March bonus appears to have eliminated the spring income swing for public employees.
Having confirmed that there was a clear change in the pattern of monthly disposable income for public employees, we now turn to their expenditure patterns.
What matters for us is whether there were any changes in the pattern of monthly expenditure from the pre-reform period to the post-reform period, and, if any, whether the changes in the monthly expenditure pattern are associated with those in income.
Therefore, what we focus on is the coefficients on the interaction terms in the expenditure regressions. If the pattern of monthly household expenditure is excessively sensitive (relative to the prediction of the LC/PIH) and is affected by the pattern of monthly income, we would expect March and April expenditures to be higher in the pre-reform period than in the post-reform period (with April expenditures likely affected by the fact that the spring bonus was paid in the middle of the month, on March 15).
That is, in that case, the coefficient ( 3 b ) on the interaction term of the March dummy and the post-reform dummy should be significantly negative, and that ( 5 b ) on the May dummy and the post-reform dummy should be significantly positive.
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The results, reported in column (3) of Table 4 and illustrated in Figure 2 , look generally consistent with this excess sensitivity argument. The monthly pattern of consumption expenditure in the post-reform period looks different from that in the pre-reform period, and the difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent level (as 11 The reason why we focus on the May rather than the April interaction term is that the sign on the latter is difficult to predict, since the income change in March probably affects expenditure with a lag. what is actually recorded in the FIES diaries is households' expenditure. Since consumption expenditure includes items of different durability, the observed association between income and expenditure may have resulted from expenditure on durable goods, for which it is reasonable to assume that the lag between expenditure and actual consumption is larger than for nondurable goods.
To examine whether this is the case, we examine expenditure patterns by subcategory. The panels in Figure 3 , which are drawn based on the coefficients reported in columns (4)- (7) of Table 4 , illustrate the change in the pattern of monthly expenditure on four expenditure subcategories, i.e., services, nondurables, semi-durables, and durables, following the abolition of the March bonus. The F-tests
show that the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the month dummies are the same before and after the March bonus abolition (or that the coefficients on the interaction terms are zero for all months) is rejected at the 1 percent significance level for almost all of the subcategory regressions (except the regression for durables in the narrowly-defined sample), again suggesting some deviation from the LC/PIH. However, there seem to be clear differences in the extent to which different expenditure subcategories are affected: while expenditure on services, semi-durables, and durables decreased significantly in March after the bonus reform ( to hold for expenditure it may still hold for consumption.
Including private sector employee households as a control group
The results in the previous section show that the monthly expenditure pattern of public employee households changed in and after FY2003. Although the abolition of the March bonus is the most obvious candidate to account for the change in expenditure patterns, we have not yet excluded other possible factors that might have affected expenditure patterns. Returning to Figure 2 , it can be seen that the post-reform expenditure pattern looks smoother not only in March but also in other months, most notably in July-August. This overall smoothing could suggest that factors other than the abolition of the March bonus may have been at play. To examine this issue, we use the sample of private sector employees as a control group. As already discussed in Section 3, the attributes of white-collar workers in the public sector and in large private sector firms are not very different, or even look homogeneous in the narrowly-defined sample, except for the timing of bonus receipts. Therefore, if something correlated with the abolition of the March bonus is responsible for the changes in expenditure patterns, inclusion of the control group in our regressions should alter the coefficients on the interaction terms in which we are interested.
Concretely, we extend our dataset to include the private sector group and run regressions of the following specification: 12 Other than PUBLIC , the variables are the same as in equation (1). PUBLIC is a dummy variable for the public sector group to distinguish it from the private sector group. The panels in Figure 4 , which are based on the estimates reported in Table 5 , illustrate the monthly income patterns of the private and the public sector group. The panels show that noticeable changes in the monthly income pattern took place (in spring) only for the public group. The monthly income patterns for the private sector group in the pre-reform and the post-reform period are largely indistinguishable, although the bonus amounts in summer and winter were slightly smaller in the post-reform period, while the spring income patterns (from February to May) for the public group have become very similar to those of the private group after the bonus reform.
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Our main interest is, of course, to see whether a similar transformation in the patterns is observed for the expenditure variables. If the monthly expenditure pattern of the public sector group stands out from the remaining patterns only in the pre-reform period, and if the remaining patterns -those of the public sector group in the post-reform period and of the private sector group in both periods -resemble each other, 12 As for the a m part, we again run the regression with a constant and eleven month dummies. 13 Our discussion here focuses on the magnitude in the difference in income patterns (or their "economic significance") that can be gleaned from the figures. In terms of statistical significance, all four income patterns are in fact significantly different, probably due to the large sample size of our dataset. Table   5 - (b) for the narrowly-defined sample).
While minor changes from the pre-reform to the post-reform period can also be noticed for the private sector group, especially for June and December, similar changes in the two regular bonus months (or overall smoothing) can be observed for the public group, suggesting that these changes probably result from a general decrease in bonus payments in the post-reform period (as already reported in Section 2), i.e., a factor common to the public and the private sector group. Indeed, after the inclusion of the private group in our sample, the statistical significance of the coefficients on the interaction terms of interest (the ds) declined considerably, while the sign on the March (May) interaction term continues to be negative (positive), which is consistent with the excessively sensitive consumption argument.
Further examination of the expenditure response for each of the four expenditure subcategories ( Figure 6 and columns (4)- (7) of Table 5 in the service regression using the narrowly-defined sample (column (4) in Table 5 - (b) To sum up, we find that the monthly expenditure pattern of the public sector group from February to May, that is, the months in which expenditure is most likely to be affected by the abolition of the March bonus, has become very similar to that of the private group after the abolition of the March bonus, suggesting some association of expenditure and the anticipated sizable change in the timing of income. However, as seen in the examination of the public sector employee-only sample in the previous section, the sensitivity of expenditure is not uniform across expenditure subcategories:
an clear reaction of expenditure to the income change is observed only for semi-durables and durables. The effect on services expenditure is ambiguous, while there is no effect on nondurables expenditure.
Summary and conclusion
Despite However, a closer look reveals that an excess sensitivity of expenditure is clearly observed only for expenditure subcategories of some durability, i.e., durables and semi-durables. Therefore, while the findings of this paper, i.e., the association between an anticipated change in the pattern of income and expenditure patterns, have important implications for policy-related issues, such as the magnitude of the fiscal multiplier, they do not rule out the possibility that Japanese households are smoothing The Japanese fiscal year runs from April to March. The figures in the table are the sum of the end-of-term allowance (kimatsu teate ) and the diligence allowance (kinben teate ) relative to monthly regular income. R-squared Root MSE Number of observations Note: All regressions are estimated by OLS and include the nominal interest rate and relative price changes as control variables. Numbers in the parentheses are robust standard errors. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. -0.94 -0.95 -0.19 -0.14 -0.21 -0.16 -0.25 Feb dum. x Public dum. x Post-reform dum. Note: All regressions are estimated by OLS and include the nominal interest rate and relative price changes as control variables. Numbers in the parentheses are robust standard errors. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
